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 chapter 2
Children’s Right to Respect for Their Human Dignity
Randi Sigurdsen
1 Introduction and Main Question
The starting point in section 104 of the Norwegian Constitution, which is 
devoted to children’s human rights, is the statement that ‘Children have the 
right to respect for their human dignity.’1 The position of the concept of hu-
man dignity in the Norwegian Constitution indicates that it is a central idea 
for children’s rights. Although the concept of human dignity is well known 
and often used in human- rights discussion, it is heavily debated.2 Some of 
the questions are linked to the uncertainty about the content of the concept, 
and others about the connection between human dignity and human rights. 
These questions cannot be overlooked in the discussion of section 104, espe-
cially since discussions of human dignity have almost, without exception, had 
their origin in the adult world. One of the significant differences between mi-
nors and grown- ups is autonomy. Normally adults have full autonomy, while 
children lack this right, a right that is regarded so highly, and often brought 
into the discussion about the content of human dignity. This is among the fac-
tors influencing a diverging approach to human dignity in a children’s rights 
context.
In this article, I will give a presentation of the reason for including human 
dignity into this specific section of the Norwegian Constitution. In order to 
discuss the legal effect of such a provision in the Constitution, it is necessary 
to explore the content of the concept. None of the other Nordic countries has 
a similar statement in their Constitutions, and there is no similar provision on 
 1 The Norwegian Supreme Court has not by December 2018 given any interpretation of section 
104, first sentence.
 2 In Norwegian legal literature the concept of human dignity is especially discussed by Bjørn 
Henning Østenstad, Heimelsspørsmål i behandling og omsorg overfor psykisk utviklingshem-
ma og aldersdemente (Fagbokforlaget 2011) 94– 151. The conference held in 2012 where a mul-
tidisciplinary group discussed the concept of human dignity from their various disciplinary 
perspectives is an example of the international debate. The book edited by Christopher Mc-
Crudden, Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press 2013) is to an extent out-
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human dignity elsewhere in the Norwegian Constitution.3 A  question to be 
asked is whether children are a vulnerable group, and more vulnerable than 
the rest of the population, and if a statement in the Constitution on human 
dignity is of special benefit for children.
It is beyond my scope to discuss human dignity in an international con-
text, even limited to human dignity from a child- law perspective. Still, human 
dignity is an international concept. National legislation on human rights has 
strong links to international conventions, international courts and official hu-
man rights organisations, which apply and interpret human rights. Therefore, 
it is not possible to overlook the international discussion and the conflicting 
understandings of human dignity.
2 Human Dignity in the Founding Documents of the Norwegian  
Constitution
A search into the founding documents gives no explicit answer to why chil-
dren`s right to respect of their human dignity became a part of s. 104, and sub-
sequently not an answer to why the concept of human dignity follows from 
the first sentence. To answer these basic questions, in this context, it is nec-
essary to start by looking into the discussion in the appointed Human Right’s 
Commission (Commission) and their reason to include a specific section on 
children’s human rights in the Constitution. The Commission stressed that 
although human rights are universal and there is no age limitation, children 
have certain special needs, and this fact must be reflected in the Constitution 
to secure their human rights.4 Their distinctive needs follow from their depen-
dence on adults, in particular, their parents or persons with similar responsi-
bility. Children’s vulnerability is another reason pointed out in the founding 
documents for children’s need for special protection of their human rights.5 
I will return to the concept of vulnerability later in this paper.
 3 But the Finnish Constitution makes multiple references to dignity as an important principle 
vis- à- vis constitutional rights.
 4 Dokument 16 (2011– 2012) Rapport til Stortingets presidentskap fra Menneskerettighetsutval-
get om menneskerettigheter i Grunnloven, 19. desember 2011 (Report from the Human Rights 
Commision to the Presidium of the Parliment on Human Rights in the Constitution, 19 De-
cember 2011) (Dok 16) 189. The report is available only in Norwegian <https:// www.stortinget 
.no/ Global/ pdf/ Dokumentserien/ 2011– 2012/ dok16- 201112.pdf> accessed 20 February 2019.
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The Commission also emphasised that a section in the Constitution de-
signed with the purpose of highlighting special aspects of children’s human 
rights will have symbolic, political and legal effect.6 Children are the future of 
every nation. As the Commission stressed, childhood is of special importance, 
and the nation has a responsibility to provide adequate conditions so that chil-
dren, in time, can evolve into responsible grown- ups. This is the symbolic side 
of the provision. The political effect is connected to obligations for the legisla-
ture and courts. Lawmakers, as well as judges and other decision makers, are 
obliged to pay attention to the concept of children’s human rights. This will 
cause a legal effect, in addition to the effect that follows when other provisions 
in the Constitution or provisions in other parts of the Norwegian legal system 
are interpreted. These interpretations cannot be contradictory to the Constitu-
tion. To fortify children’s human rights, the content of s. 104 had to differ from 
the other provisions in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. The intention was to 
formulate Section 104 as a supplement to the other provisions in the Bill of 
Rights.7
With this as a backdrop to the reason why human dignity became a part 
of s. 104, the Commission starts their reasoning for enshrining human dignity 
in the Constitution with a reference to the necessity to underline children as 
equal human beings. They have no less value than adults.8 Children cannot 
be treated unfairly just because they are children. The Commission explicit-
ly said that they preferred the principle of equality to the principle of non- 
discrimination.9 In addition they emphasised that s.  104 should be read in 
conjunction with the principle of equal treatment as follows from s. 98, which 
states:  ‘All people are equal under the law. No human being must be subject 
to unfair or disproportionate different treatment.’ Furthermore, the Commis-
sion stated that a provision declaring children as equal human beings will un-
derline children as holders of all the other human rights, unless otherwise is 
decided.10 The Commission stressed that the aim to declare children as equal 
to adults through the reference to human dignity would be a ‘signal’ provi-
sion (fanebestemmelse).11 The signal would extend to imply equality between 
children and adults, and among children, but not as far as to treat children as 
adults or give children similar rights as adults.
 6 Dok 16 (n 4) para 32.5.1.
 7 Dok 16 (n 4) para 32.5.1.
 8 Dok 16 (n 4) para 32.5.2.
 9 Dok 16 (n 4) para 32.5.2.
 10 Dok 16 (n 4) para 32.5.2.
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The debate in the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) followed the same line 
of argumentation as the Commission in this regard, and stressed that children 
are equal human beings and that the Bill of Rights apply to children as well.12
Human dignity as a legal concept was brought into the Constitution without 
any interpretation of the content or any reference to the ongoing internation-
al debate about the role of human dignity in relation to human rights. The 
Commission did not, inter alia, give any reason why children need the special 
protection human dignity might give. But as part of the process of the com-
prehensive Constitutional reform, an obvious aim was to strengthen children’s 
legal position.
To clarify whether human dignity is a suitable concept to strengthen chil-
dren’s legal position, the theoretical foundation for human dignity has to be 
explored. This includes the historical background of the concept of human 
dignity and the essence of the concept. Thereafter, some current questions on 
human dignity of special interest from a child prospective will be discussed, 
inter alia, the relation between human dignity and autonomy and whether hu-
man dignity is a right or a principle.
3 The Concept of Human Dignity—a Short Presentation
3.1 A Historical and Ideological Basis for Human Dignity
Human dignity, as well as other international legal concepts, cannot be under-
stood in the same way worldwide. The concept has to be interpreted and un-
derstood in a national context, due to differing societies, economic resources, 
cultures and legal systems. A division between a national and an internation-
al understanding of human rights terms is well known, for instance, in legal 
practice, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) leaves a margin of 
 appreciation to each member state. However, the concept needs a core to have 
influence as an international guide. If not, human dignity will serve as a rhe-
torical flourish, a loose term, and a term that does not convey state obligations. 
The challenge is to establish the core of international human rights provisions, 
to emphasise the importance as international legal instruments.
The first question to ask is whether it is possible to identify this core. Here, 
several points of confusion occur. Is human dignity a social, religious or philo-
sophical concept, or is it a concept that depicts values from these enterprises? 
Do these values establish the core of the concept, if such a core exists? These 
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are questions discussed by several academics.13 I will, therefore, give a short 
summarisation of what, in my view, are the central elements in, and points of, 
these discussions.
First of all, it is useful to look back at the history. The idea of human dignity 
has deep historical roots, but it is hard to identify when the concept entered 
the legal scene.14 The claims of liberty and equality in the revolutions in both 
the United States (1776) and France (1789) might be a starting point.15 Even 
though human dignity is not included in the Declarations of the Rights of Man, 
conditions for dignity to emerge as a legal concept later on, were created. Ear-
lier on, the word dignity was reserved to the ‘dignities’, those with privileges.16 
The Constitution that was implemented in Norway some decades later (1814) 
was based on the same ideas, although neither the words human rights nor 
dignity can be recognised in the text. Human dignity can hardly be discussed 
without reference to the philosopher Immanuel Kant and the categorical im-
perative: individuals should not be treated simply as a means to an end.17 In the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, social and political movements brought 
new elements to the ideas of human dignity. The abolition of slavery and child 
labour in Western Europe in the nineteenth century has to be viewed in light 
of a growing respect for human dignity. The idea of human dignity played a sig-
nificant role in religious debates about what constituted human well- being.18 
The wars in these centuries, culminating in the horrors of the Second World 
War, strengthened the debate of human dignity. These historical examples re-
flect a philosophical, religious and social approach to the concept of human 
dignity. Each of them bring, to some extent, different values into the human 
dignity debate.
 13 In June 2012, a multidisciplinary group were brought together in a conference held in 
Oxford, United Kingdom to discuss the concept of human dignity. The outcome of the 
conference is to be found in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity 
(Oxford University Press 2013). Questions related to children and human dignity were 
not a subject in the conference.
 14 Catherine Dupré, ‘Constructing the Meaning of Human Dignity:  Four Questions’, in 
Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press 
2013) 113– 121 (117).
 15 Catherine Dupré, ‘Constructing the Meaning of Human Dignity:  Four Questions’ (n 
14) 118.
 16 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(2008) 19 The European Journal of International Law 655– 724 (656).
 17 Immanuel Kant, ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ Section 38 of the Doctrine of Virtue.
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Kant‘s philosophy has played a significant role in establishing a non- religious 
based concept of dignity. In my opinion, his ideas have established a bridge to 
the legal concept of dignity – all human beings are of the same equal value. 
This essence in the legal concept of dignity is clearly rooted in United Nations 
documents of human rights. Through these texts, human dignity indubitably 
entered the legal scene. The reference to human dignity as inherent in every 
person follows from the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) and further enshrined under article 1. Since then, the concept is 
regularly enshrined in UN declarations and conventions, for instance, the Dec-
laration of the Rights of the Child (1959) and in the preamble of Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (crc) (1989).
The architects behind United Nations Charter and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, amongst them Jacques Maritain and René Cassin, em-
phasised that dignity has a practical meaning in establishing human rights 
to promote the common good. Human dignity is the basis on which human 
rights could be said to exist.19 Beyond an agreement of dignity as a central 
starting point in the theory of human rights, it is rather unclear why and how 
the concept gained this position, despite the prominent position the concept 
has come up with in international human rights instruments.20 However, the 
concept of human dignity provides a theoretical basis for the idea of human 
rights in absence of any other common consensus. With human dignity as a 
foundation for human rights, it signals that every human being has worth and 
is worthy of respect, and this grants them their rights. And at the core is, as 
Aharon Barak has put it, humanity.21
The discussion of the concept of human dignity contains elements and 
values from several disciplines, and these are interwoven into a multi- layered 
concept. For the purpose of this article, it is not necessary to delve deeper into 
the long- term controversy of the concept of human dignity. Nevertheless, al-
though it is difficult to land a universally accepted legal definition of human 
dignity, the term has its substance. The history of the term is rather long, 
but it is, as Christopher McCrudden emphasises, a relatively new scholarly 
 19 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(n 16) 662– 663 and 676– 677; Catherine Dupré, ‘Constructing the Meaning of Human 
Dignity: Four Questions’ (n 14).
 20 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(n 16) 678.
 21 Aharon Barak, ‘The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right’ in Christopher 
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phenomenon.22 This is a reason why it is hard to unveil the substantive ele-
ments that establish the core.
3.2 The Core of the Concept of Dignity—from the Perspective of the Child
In the search for the core of human dignity, an option is to take a positive or 
negative approach. The positive approach can be described as an attempt to 
identify core components of human dignity. One example where the legal con-
cept of dignity is visible is in the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (EU Charter) article 1, which reads: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must 
be respected and protected.’ This is a statement of inviolability and a corre-
sponding duty to respect and protect human dignity. Further, the EU Charter 
lists several provisions that can be regarded as components of human dignity; 
the right to life (article 2), the right to respect for physical and mental integrity 
(article 3), the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment (article 4), and the prohibition of slavery, forced labour, and hu-
man trafficking (article 5).
The negative approach suggests that dignity may best be understood in the 
light of factors that encroach upon personal integrity, in particular, humiliat-
ing and degrading treatment. Jürgen Habermas points out different types of 
humiliation that is in conflict with the idea of human dignity.23 The features 
of the concept of human dignity appear as an effect of the violations. Whether 
the positive or the negative approach is the best way to approach the vague-
ness of dignity might be discussed. Still, the negative approach appears to hold 
an advantage, as vagueness implies a need for dynamic interpretation. A posi-
tive definition could be considered as comprehensive, which is a disadvantage.
For instance, the list of provisions in the EU Charter mentioned above can 
hardly be more than examples of what dignity can be. The provisions in arti-
cles 25 and 31, where reference to dignity appears in relation to ‘the right of the 
elderly to lead a life of dignity …’ and ‘the right to working conditions which 
respect … dignity’, are rather confusing. Do elderly people require more respect 
for their dignity than the rest of the population? What about children, young 
or old with disabilities, refugees. Do they not need to lead a life of dignity? And 
what about the conditions of life for those who are not part of the workforce, 
among them children?
 22 Christopher McCrudden, ‘In Pursuit of Human Dignity:  An Introduction to Current 
Debates’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 1– 58 (4).
 23 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Human Dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights’ (2010) 41 
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Defining human dignity broadly is more confusing than enlightening. When 
the concept is diluted thus, it loses its power. The EU Charter is an example 
of this. The provisions in articles 2 through 5 are uncontroversial, at least in 
Western, democratic societies, and they will be secured through the provision 
in article 1. The measure of these articles is to protect everyone. However, when 
human dignity is parcelled in relation to limited groups, the question of inter-
est is whether this group of people is more likely to have its dignity infringed 
upon. If so, the group may be characterised as more vulnerable than the aver-
age population.
The equality principle is as already said, apparently designated as a core 
of human dignity by the Norwegian Human Rights Commission. This point 
of view is coinciding with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which 
states: – ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.24 Ev-
ery human being is equal to respect for human dignity as every human being is 
worthy of respect and every person has rights from the moment they are born. 
Human dignity requires reciprocity  – I  must respect your human dignity as 
you must respect mine. Also, in international literature, equality is said to be 
a part of the core of human dignity.25 So, when a group of the population has 
special needs, it is important to highlight their human dignity to secure a basis 
of equal treatment. The principle of equality does not, however, refer to equal 
treatment in every respect. Equality as a part of human dignity underline that 
some rights apply to everyone. Respect for human dignity cannot be fulfilled 
without safeguarding these rights. Therefore, some rights have to be a part of 
the core of human dignity. Identification of these rights is too complicated to 
be an aim of this article. It could, in principle, be argued that the violation 
of any right violates dignity. But dignity argumentation cannot be taken this 
far. If it were, the distinctive contribution of the normative justification of the 
principle would be lost.
Still, there are some rights that, in my opinion, are crucial to the respect of 
children’s human dignity. The question is which types of humiliation are in 
conflict with the idea of children’s right to respect for their human dignity. This 
represents the negative approach to human dignity.
Violation of a child’s physical or psychological integrity is a violation of the 
child’s human dignity. The UN committee of the crc has underpinned the 
 24 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, article 1.
 25 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights’ (n 16) 690 with further references and 681; Bernhard Schlink, ‘The Concept of 
Human Dignity:  Current Usages, Future Discourses’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), 
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connection between human dignity and physical and psychological integrity 
of children.26 The concept of integrity and human dignity are linked together.27 
The right to life can be looked upon as a part of the right to the protection of 
personal integrity. Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
and prohibition of slavery are also parts of the protection of personal integrity.
Disrespect for family and private life will infringe human dignity. Also, the 
lack of opportunity to have one’s voice heard, to be an object and not a subject 
in public or legal processes, are other elements contrary to the respect for hu-
man dignity.
The purpose of identifying basic values underlying the concept of human 
dignity is to give it strength in a legal debate. From a child’s perspective, it is 
important to identify rights that are likely to be violated due to their inferiority 
and dependency. The vaguer the concept is, the more likely it will be deval-
ued, will lose an evolving function and will be regarded as a rhetorical nullity 
that does not strengthen children’s legal position. The strength follows from 
the basic values, which are not subject to change, and are timeless. However, 
these basic values are, as Christopher McCrudden writes, adaptable to chang-
ing ideas of what being human constitutes.28 In this regard, the concept has a 
high level of generality, and is open to dynamic interpretation.
4 Dignity without Autonomy?
Freedom is a term connected to both dignity and equality. These terms are 
closely connected in the preamble and in article 1 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as well as in other human right conventions.29 Freedom is a 
foundation for autonomy. However, this leads necessarily neither to the con-
clusion that freedom is part of the concept of human dignity, nor that freedom 
and autonomy may be used as synonyms in a discussion on human dignity. The 
 26 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 13: The right of the child 
to freedom from all forms of violence (18 April 2011) CRC/ C/ GC/ 13 para 2 and 7.
 27 The concept of integrity is discussed in a child law perspective of eg Michael Freeman, 
‘The Value and Values of Children’s Rights’ in Antonella Invernizzi and Jane Williams (eds), 
The Human Rights of Children (Ashgate 2011) 21– 36 (31); Ursulla Kilkelly, The Child and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Ashgate 1999) 149; General Comment no. 13 
(2011) (n 26) para 3(b) and 7(c).
 28 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(n 16) 677.
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possible link between dignity and freedom will not be discussed here, nor will 
whether freedom fits under the panoply of dignity. I will focus on the inter-
connection between dignity and autonomy, a theme discussed by several legal 
philosophers and authors.30
Autonomy is linked to the concept of rationality. The ability of rational 
thought is what separates humans from other animals. Human beings are able 
to adapt information, use the information in the actual situation, be aware of 
alternative solutions, and make a choice and stand by it. Without the power 
of reason, this process would be impossible. Normally, an adult person does 
not need to prove him or her to hold all the elements that are required to have 
the full status of autonomy. Children pose a problem in this regard, but so do 
adults with cognitive disabilities, for instance, dementia. Firstly, children do 
not possess the same level of freedom as adults. Children are not in the same 
position as adults to make free choices. This fact is a central part of the con-
cept of childhood. Secondly, children at least young children, do not have the 
same extent of intellectual skills as most adults, therefore, they are considered 
immature. Despite the lack of intellectual skills and limited experience, even 
very small children have views in personal matters. As stressed by the UN Com-
mittee on Children’s Rights, the right to be heard, without meeting any per-
sonal demands in personal matters, is fundamental.31 The starting point is the 
assumption that everyone is capable of having views. It is not up to the child 
to prove her or his capacity.32 So, even if a person is not able to express reason 
for his or her standpoint, the person might still have an opinion, perhaps based 
on earlier experiences. Preventing individuals – young or old – from stating 
their views freely in matters affecting them is contrary to respecting their dig-
nity. Therefore, the right to be heard is more fundamental than the right to act 
autonomously. As Conor O’Mahony observed, personal autonomy is subject 
to restrictions and limitations.33 So, it has to be, to protect the human dignity 
of every individual. If not, people may make autonomous choices to a type of 
conduct that violates human dignity of other people. The many restrictions 
in the law, such as exists in criminal law, are examples of legitimate and nec-
essary restrictions on personal autonomy and self- determination. This is the 
 30 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(n 16) 656– 663; Conor O’Mahony, ‘There is no such thing as a right to dignity’ (2012) 10 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 551– 574 (565).
 31 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12: The Right to be Heard 
(1 July 2009) CRC/ C/ GC/ 12 para 2.
 32 General Comment no. 12 (n 31) para 20.
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reason why the connection between respect for human dignity and autonomy 
has to be weaker than between dignity and the possibility that persons can 
express their views in personal matters. Human dignity and autonomy can-
not be mixed together. Instead, these two concepts have to be seen in light of 
each other.
Until children reach a level of cognitive maturity, there is a general percep-
tion that they must be protected. Children’s need for protection is one of the 
central values that the crc is built upon, and so is the right to be heard. The 
latter right shall not easily be put aside in order to protect children. Instead, 
opportunities for the child to be heard shall be promoted, to stimulate the de-
velopment of the personality and the child’s evolving capacities.34 In contrast 
with the rights of most other groups, the rights of the child might be under-
stood as conflicting, for example, with protections dealing with the right to be 
heard. Instead, these rights have to be interpreted in the light of each other in 
order to promote the human dignity of the child.
Protection of those who are not able to secure their own interests and rights 
has to be a part of the concept of human dignity. If someone is excluded from 
the concept due to their lack of autonomy, there is no equality for human be-
ings. Individuals belonging to vulnerable groups have a particular need for 
 respect of their human dignity, and because children are marginalised and 
 disadvantaged, they need the protection that human dignity gives.35
5 Is Respect for Human Dignity a Right or a Principle?
The concept of human dignity is unquestionably powerful. The uncertainty 
is how this power should be conveyed. There appears to be two different ap-
proaches in the legal understanding of human dignity and thus how the con-
cept might have a pivotal role in a legal debate. The concept may be regarded 
as the founding principle that human rights derive from, or as a human right in 
itself. If human dignity is to be considered as a right, it invokes a rule. A right 
differs from a principle. In Robert Alexy’s words: ‘Principles require that some-
thing be realized to the greatest extent legally and factually possible. They are 
thus not definitive but only prima facie requirements.’36 The character of rules 
he describes as follows: ‘… rules insist that one does exactly as required, they 
 34 General Comment no. 12 (n 31) para 79.
 35 Conor O’Mahony, ‘There is no such thing as a right to dignity’ (n 30) 565– 566.









Randi Sigurdsen - 9789004382817
Downloaded from Brill.com02/24/2020 02:28:33PM
via University of Tromso
30 Sigurdsen
contain a decision about what is to happen within the realm of the legally and 
factually possible.’37 Which of these conflicting understandings of human dig-
nity is the ‘correct’ one has to be discussed in both an international and na-
tional context. The power of the concept may be strengthened or weakened 
according to the approach. Another issue is whether dignity embodies a neg-
ative or positive obligation of the State. These discussions are extensive. Thus, 
I will only refer to the main arguments.
Human dignity is inherent to all humans and is an individual concept, in 
the way that everyone shall be treated with respect for their human dignity. 
This gives an assumption of a right – a right to dignity – a right in the mean-
ing of being treated with dignity or to lead a dignified life.38 In some Consti-
tutions, human dignity is expressed as a right. Two examples are the South 
African and the German Constitutions, whose wording has been origin to the 
subject of debate by legal scholars.39 Article 1 of German Basic Law states as 
follows:
 (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty 
of all state authority.
 (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable 
human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in 
the world.
 (3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary as directly applicable law.
Read in conjunction with article 79(3), the constitutional right to human dig-
nity is not subject to change through a constitutional amendment, even if the 
German Constitution does not actually use the phrase ‘right to dignity’. The 
concept has, however, generally been treated as a right in interpretations of 
the Constitution.40 It is an absolute right. Section 10 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa reads as follows: ‘Everyone has inherent dignity 
and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.’ Although the word 
‘right’ is used directly in the text or the wording is interpreted as a ‘right’, it has 
 37 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 36) 57.
 38 Conor O’Mahony, ‘There is no such thing as a right to dignity’ (n 30) 559.
 39 Robert Alexy, A  Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 36); Aharon Barak, Proportionality: 
Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge University Press 2012); Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the realistic Utopia of Human Rights’ 
(n 23).
 40 See eg Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia 
of Human Rights’ (n 23); Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial 
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been discussed whether the character of a principle is more significant.41 If 
human dignity is understood as a right, a consequence is that the ‘right’ might 
be understood as a right of free disposal. As dignity is a characteristic of man, it 
cannot be at the disposal of the individual. Nobody can waive their human dig-
nity. This fact is a reason why it is problematic to use the term ‘right’ in relation 
to human dignity.42 In this might be a reason why alleged violations of human 
dignity brought before the Constitutional Court in Germany are coupled with 
alleged violations of other individual rights.43
Because the concept of dignity has a link to equality, it expresses an under-
lying value of human rights. Violation of human rights is often a violation of 
human dignity. The assumption that every human right has a dignity core,44 
substantiates the understanding of human dignity as a principle and, as a prin-
ciple, it has to contain a degree of vagueness. Human dignityis more than the 
human rights derived from it, because the obligation to respect human dignity 
exists even though the concept is not used in legislation or court practice. It is 
crucial that respect for human dignity is understood as a strong obligation on 
the state authorities. This gives human dignity clearly the character of a princi-
ple, which requires it to be realised to the greatest extent possible.45
When human dignity is expressed in a Constitution, it clearly signals a 
foundational value and principle. Rules that follows from a Constitution have 
to be interpreted in the light of the principles. The concept of human digni-
ty expands the interpretation horizon the constitutional rights. Furthermore, 
the concept influences interpretation of all others rules as well. This gives the 
concept of dignity a legally significant influence in the interpretation of the 
constitution as a document. The specific rights enshrined in the Constitution 
bind the lawmaker.
The founding documents of the Bill of Rights in the Norwegian Constitution 
indicate, albeit not explicitly, that human dignity is the foundational principle 
for the s. 104, and a foundation for other child specific rights.
 41 See eg Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights’ (n 16) 680– 681.
 42 In the unofficial translation of s 104 into English the word ‘right’ is used: ‘Children have 
the right to respect for their human dignity.’ There is, however, no signs in the preparatory 
works of an intention to establish a right to dignity.
 43 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(n 16) 681.
 44 Dieter Grimm, ‘Dignity in a legal context and as an absolute right’ in Christopher McCrudden 
(ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press 2013) 381– 391 (390).
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6 Children as a Vulnerable Group
As already addressed, the concept of human dignity belongs to a category of 
constitutional norms that constrain public power.46 From a child- law perspec-
tive this is of importance, because children are vulnerable and dependent on 
adults, but as already said, children are of no less value than adults are. These 
factors have influence on the meaning of human dignity of children and, con-
sequently, which rights are of specific importance for children.
The assertion that children are vulnerable, however, has to be challenged. 
Vulnerability is not a specific characteristic of children, it is a fundamental part 
of being human.47 We are all more or less vulnerable throughout life. In some 
stages, we are less, and in some stages, we are more vulnerable, typically in the 
beginning and end of life. No one can decide not to be vulnerable. We can try 
to avoid becoming vulnerable, for example, by having a healthy lifestyle, but 
we cannot eliminate all risks. One moment we are healthy and strong, the next 
we are weak and vulnerable, at the mercy of other people’s good intentions. 
So, why is it so important to underline children’s vulnerability in relation to 
human dignity as the Norwegian Human Rights Commission does? Many peo-
ple face similar or the same challenges as children do, in a part or even, most 
of their lives. But children are in a special position, as they are both vulnerable 
and dependent, and they cannot free themselves from the bonds to the parents 
or other adults who have a responsibility towards them. Children need a safe 
environment to develop to grown- ups who are able to exercise their rights and 
duties that serves themselves and the society.48
In my opinion, a characteristic of a vulnerable person is inability to secure 
his or her interests and rights.49 Two factors are particularly central to chil-
dren’s vulnerability – their age, a biological factor, and their dependence, a so-
cial factor. Everybody is a child from birth until their eighteenth birthday. This 
period of life contains the most fundamental changes, from lacking capacity 
to survive on one’s own, to become an independent, self- sufficient person. The 
period of childhood embraces individuals who are well equipped to take care 
 46 Robert Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 
131– 140 (131).
 47 Martha Albertson Fineman, eg ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’ (2010) 
60 Emory Law Journal 251– 275 (especially 266– 269).
 48 Innst. 186 (n 12) para 2.1.10.
 49 See also Jonathan Herring, ‘Vulnerability, Children and the Law’ in Michael Freeman (ed), 
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of their own affairs, to others who are obviously not. This must be borne in 
mind in the discussion of vulnerability.
Law endows parents the right to secure the rights and interests of children. 
When the parents fulfil their obligations children are not particularly vulner-
able, at least compared to other groups who are potential victims of dignity 
breaches, but lack someone who has a responsibility to claim their rights. 
Problems especially arise when parents do not fulfil their parental duties. 
In such cases, children are vulnerable, and even more vulnerable than other 
comparable groups, because of their legal bond to the parents, and their de-
pendence on them, for instance, practically and economically. The barrier to 
oppose the individuals you are dependent on is one negative effect of depen-
dence. Our legal system is based on the assumption that parents’ decisions are 
in the best interests of the child. Whether the decisions infringe upon chil-
dren’s interests and rights may be difficult to decide. Children are supposed to 
obey their parents’ decisions, and according to respect for family and private 
life, public services can only in some, strictly limited cases, supervise decisions 
made by the parents. Until children are of age to form their own opinions, and 
are more independent, they will have the status of being vulnerable, because 
of an uncertainty whether parents fulfil their legal duties. The combination of 
age and dependency places children in a twofold vulnerable situation. Propor-
tional to increasing age and decreasing level of dependence, children will be 
little- by- little less vulnerable. Until then, the concept of vulnerability could be 
considered a litmus test – a test of how we deal with the most vulnerable in 
society. Section 104 of the Norwegian Constitution may be viewed in this per-
spective, where the reference to human dignity is of importance to neutralise 
vulnerability. However, children are not the only group to be potential victims 
of dignity breaches. Whether it is more important to protect children than oth-
ers, is an extensive discussion.
Even though the concept of vulnerability has a positive resonance when the 
aim is to strengthen children’s rights, there are also negative effects. The focus 
on vulnerability causes a gap between the vulnerable, the weak and the not 
vulnerable, in other words, the independent, strong person. Considering chil-
dren to be vulnerable may result in a paternalistic attitude towards them. The 
effect may be ‘us and them’ and undermining of the idea of equality. To avoid 
a paternalistic approach to human dignity, the core of the concept has to be 
highlighted. An essential part is the right of freedom. Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights.’ Even if the term freedom is not the same concept for 
children as for adults, children are not without rights of freedom. The right to 
be heard in all matters affecting the child is one of them.
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The link between human dignity and the right to be heard is rooted in the 
Norwegian Constitution in s. 104 ss. 1. The first sentence declares the need to 
respect human dignity, while the second sentence discusses the right to be 
heard. The placement in the same subsection may be interpreted as a signal 
that an aim of the reference to the right to be heard is to avoid violation of hu-
man dignity.50 The child is given a tool – the right to be heard. One purpose is 
to implement the meaning of the child when deciding the child’s best interests 
(ss. 2). In this way, the intention is to avoid a vulnerable situation for the child. 
Also, the concept of equal worth is reinforced. As adults are afforded the op-
portunity to express their views on matters affecting them, so should children.
7 The Significance of the Concept Of Human Dignity in a  
Child- Right’s Perspective
The debate concerning dignity can be described on two levels: the theoretical 
foundation and the more practical one as a guide to action – to seek the argu-
ments rooted in human dignity as tools to address and amend the legal and so-
cial status of children. How these arguments shall be identified has no obvious 
answer – as there are conflicting understandings of what children’s interests 
are, for example, for more protection or more influence in their own lives. And 
as we often see, dignity arguments are present on both sides in the debate.
The concept of human dignity is necessarily abstract to allow it a role in the 
human rights debate. In a constitutional context, human dignity is a founda-
tion on which human rights are built. Constitutional rights have the purpose of 
realising the principle of human dignity. As these rights are established within 
the same source of law, they often partly overlap each other. For example, the 
best interests of the child and the right to be heard are a tandem. However, 
the abstract nature of human dignity means that the interpretation has to be 
contextual, be it a national, regional or global context. The interpretation shall 
bridge the gap between the abstract norm and the more practical norm.
Even if the concept of dignity is abstract, it has a pivotal role in bringing 
children’s rights and their legal position to centre stage. It has both a political 
and symbolic effect. The political effect is that it underlines the position of 
children as rights holders, and the duty for the government, courts and officials 
 50 Dok 16 (n 4) para 35.5.3. For a more detailed discussion of children’s right to participate, see 
Anna Nylund, ‘Children’s Right to Participate in Decision- Making in Norway: Paternalism 
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to respect those rights. All of them are obliged to take constitutional provision 
into account in their activities. This, in turn, gives the provision a practical and 
legal effect, just as the Commission’s intention was.
In the history of human rights, human dignity has been a turning point. The 
history unveils that the question about human rights has started in the world 
of able- bodied adult males, persons who are aware of the benefit of rights, es-
pecially freedom rights. As the debate grows more mature, the question about 
rights is turned to groups that differ from the outset. Often the last groups 
brought into the human rights sphere are children and those with cognitive dis-
abilities. In this perspective human dignity, with all its disadvantages, explicitly 
set down that at the core of human dignity is humanity, and as human beings 
we are equal, young and old. In this respect, human dignity serves as a corner-
stone, or as the Norwegian Human Rights Commission put it, a signal provision 
in human rights’ discussions. But, as a principle, human dignity also has a piv-
otal role even if it is not expressed in the Constitution or in other legal texts.
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